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Abstract 
In this paper, I analyze a type of externalist enactivism defended by Riccardo 
Manzotti. Such radical versions of enactivism are gaining more attention, es-
pecially in cognitive science and cognitive robotics. They are radical in that 
their notion of representation is purely referential, and content is conflated 
with reference. Manzotti follows in the footsteps of early causal theories of 
reference that had long been shown to be inadequate. It is commonly known 
that radical versions of externalism may lead to difficulties with the notion of 
representation, especially if they cannot help themselves with the notion of 
syntax. I argue that a type of externalism present in Manzotti’s enactivism 
may well lead to anti-representationalism.  
Keywords:  anti-representationalism;  enactivism;  causal  spread;  content; 
presentation. 
In this paper, I analyze a kind of externalist enactivism defended, for exam-
ple,  by Riccardo  Manzotti.  Such  radical  versions  of  enactivism are  gaining 
more attention, especially in cognitive science. However, it is not always ap-
preciated that they involve radically externalist approaches to meaning. They 
are radical in that their notion of representation is purely referential, and 
content is conflated with reference. It is commonly known that radical ver-
sions of externalism may lead to difficulties with the notion of representation, 
especially if they cannot help themselves with the notion of syntax (or syntac-
tic  form, as  in (Fodor  2008)).  Without  such  notion, however,  the  enactivist 
view may be hardly tenable. 
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I argue that a type of externalism present in Manzotti’s enactivism may well 
lead to anti-representationalism. Admittedly, he does not use the term “repre-
sentation”  and  argues  that  the  notion  of  “presentation”  should  replace  it 
(Manzotti 2006). However, his “presentation” seems to play the role tradition-
ally assigned to representation. Whether we call it “presentation” or “repre-
sentation”, the deeper problem is that it does not seem to answer the basic 
question of what its specific job would be, as opposed to any other factor that 
mediates  perception  and  action.  For  this  reason,  his  “presentational”  view 
may collapse to anti-representationalism, especially in light of his arguments 
for mind’s causal spread. 
The aim of this paper is, first, to show some undesired consequences that such 
a kind externalism has for mental representation. Second, I want to show that 
even presentational or anti-representational views are in trouble when they 
help  themselves  with  the  notion  of  causation  to  define  representation  or 
presentation (or its anti-representational substitute). What is interesting, ex-
ternalists such as Manzotti follow in the footsteps of early causal theories of 
reference that have long been shown to be inadequate. To justify this claim, 
I will  show  some  similarities  between  radically  externalist  enactivism  and 
early  causal  theories  of  Dretske  (Dretske  1982)  and  Stampe  (Stampe 
1977). I will conclude by pointing out that some externalist theories, such as 
Manzotti’s, are not acceptable because the problems they create are simply 
unsolvable. 
 
1. Meaning and content 
In this paper, I will appeal to two notions: meaning and content. Some initial 
explication is in order. These notions will be characterized as follows: 
By “content” I will understand a non-formal property of a sign that allows us 
to distinguish two different expressions, even if they have the same reference. 
As a result, two expressions (e.g. “George Bush” and “ex-president”) cannot be 
substituted in referentially opaque contexts, i.e.: 
George Bush voted for Barack Obama during the last election in the USA. 
The  US  ex-president  voted  for  Barack  Obama  during  the  last  election  in 
the USA. 
By meaning, I understand – just like Frege – reference (so a meaning of a “cat” 
is every instance of a cat, either black, white, brown, and so forth). 
A theory of representation that does not include meaning or content as as-
pects of representation usually leads to inexorable difficulties. This is the rea-
son why radical internalism (by eliminating meaning from the purview of the 
theory  of  mental  representation)  still  remains  so  controversial.  Today,  the AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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proponents of radical internalism have to offer additional reasons to justify 
their view against common objections (Segal 2000; Kriegel 2008) (I do not want 
to claim that it’s impossible to defend radical internalism; all I imply is that 
this  view  simply  requires  further  justification).  Others  either  opt  for  two-
factor theories (Block 1987; Block 1981) and juxtapose narrow content with 
a theory of reference or reject internalism altogether, as in the long-arm, or 
externalist, theory of representation (Greenberg and Harman 2006). While the 
latter tries to extend the notion of content so as to include the roles tradition-
ally played by the notion of reference, the former tries to establish an appro-
priate  relationship  between  the  meaning  and  content  of  representations 
(which is not to say that this approach is entirely successful in this regard, see 
(Fodor and Lepore 1992)).  
 
2. Manzotti’s rejection of content 
Before I proceed to present Manzotti’s views on mental representation, some 
elucidation is in order. Riccardo Manzotti is mainly known for his work on 
consciousness,  and  he  defends  the  view  that  phenomenal  consciousness  is 
also  extended  in  space.  In  that,  he  goes  further  than  (Clark  and  Chalmers 
1998), who believe that only the cognitive mind is extended, not phenomenal 
consciousness. Yet Manzotti’s view is systematic enough to imply a fairly clear 
account of representation (or “presentation” as he calls it). Also, his account of 
enactivism and externalism seems to be gaining popularity among roboticists 
and cognitive scientists (Manzotti’s being roboticist himself). For this reason, it 
may be instructive to analyze the conceptual framework implied by a growing 
body of cognitive research. Here, I will focus only on his views on “presenta-
tion”, putting aside his ontological or metaphysical position, as it is quite com-
plex. I do not think that anything really important hinges on the fact that I do 
not analyze his process metaphysics at any length here. By avoiding it, I will 
simply deal with methodological assumptions that he shares with other enac-
tivists, who consider the world to be its best representation (Brooks 2003). It 
will be instructive to see what the cash value of this claim is, regardless of 
metaphysical views of its proponents. 
As a radical externalist, Manzotti rejects content in his account of representa-
tion. In this sense, his view is similarly extreme as radical internalism, which 
rejects meaning but not content. Manzotti’s view is, in other words, purely 
referential. There are other proponents of purely referential accounts of rep-
resentation,  one  of  the  most  prominent  being  (Fodor  2008).  The  most  im-
portant difference is that in contrast to Fodor, Manzotti does not seem to find 
any use  for the  notion  of  the  syntactic form  to explicate  the  why  “George 
W. Bush” and “The US ex-president”, even if co-referential, are not substituta-
ble in referentially opaque contexts, whereas Fodor does. Also, Fodor has long Spread Mind and Causal Theories of Content 
 
90 
 
rejected the simplistic version of the causal theory of content that Manzotti 
seems to presuppose. 
Most naturalistic theories of representation find themselves in trouble when 
they try to reduce representational relations to relationships of similarity or 
covariance (Fodor 1984). Manzotti supports the covariance theory in its causal 
version even if he rejects the Cartesian gulf between the subject and the ob-
ject. He argues that on the latter view, the emergence of representation seems 
to be a miracle: 
Up to now, the nature of the [representational – K.B.] relation is a tantalizing 
mystery. Different solutions have been proposed: correlation, causation, law-
like  causation,  emergence,  identity,  supervenience.  None  has  proved  to  be 
completely satisfactory. (Manzotti 2006: 47) 
Manzotti insists that instead of “representation” we should say “presentation”. 
He claims that representation 
(…) is used as an explanatory notion with a meaning of its own — a represen-
tation  is  something  that  presents  (or re-presents) something  else.  (Manzotti 
2003: 289) 
He understands mind as spread physically and spatiotemporally beyond the 
skin. He illustrates this claim by using the metaphor of a rainbow:  
As a unity, although constituted by a series of physical drops of water in space 
reflecting the light in a certain way, cannot be defined without knowing where 
and how it will be seen. (Manzotti 2006: 50) 
For this reason: 
(...) drops of water reflect the sunlight in the same manner, yet only those 
which have a particular geometrical relation to the observer, due to his/her 
position and to the direction of the sun rays, are seen as part of the rainbow 
(...) A given rainbow exists only when the observer is in a given position with 
respect to the external stimulus. (Manzotti 2006: 50) 
In his view, there is no separation between mind and the world because what 
a particular mind perceives is in the continuous process common for particu-
lar minds and the world. What is more (and more worrying!), everything that 
an individual mind can perceive is veridical. He believes that everything we 
have in memory comes from the world: 
According to the process view presented here, memory and mental imagery 
have  a  phenomenal  aspect  because  they  are  “perception  delayed  in  time”. 
Whenever we remember something, an uninterrupted causal chain originated 
in  an  object/event/state  of  affairs  reaches  its  end  in  the  brain.  (Manzotti 
2006: 65) 
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There are researchers who also think that memory does not require represen-
tation,  so  he  is  not  alone  here;  however,  they  do  not  seem  to  claim  that 
memory should be identified with perception (see (Freeman 1991) on the ol-
factory memory of rabbits).  
However, Manzotti needs to say what illusion is (or at least seems to be if all 
perception is veridical indeed): 
I propose to see illusions as instances of infrequent correlations among physi-
cal  events.  Slightly  more  formally,  I  propose  to  see  illusions  as  situations 
where an event C — normally perceived in conjunction with some other event 
A  —  is  exceptionally  perceived  in  conjunction  with  some  other  event 
B. (Manzotti 2006: 68) 
And then he concludes: 
It is supposed that A is perceived instead of B. However what is perceived is, as 
in normal situations, C. The hypothesis of illusions is unnecessary and the con-
tinuity with the external physical world is maintained. (Manzotti 2006: 68) 
But the claim that one can explain away misrepresentation in such terms is 
deeply problematic. Explaining illusions, or any malfunction, in terms of fre-
quency is controversial. Take a simple biological example: sperm. Very few 
sperm actually serve their purpose (Millikan 1984: 29). Similarly, beavers may 
splash their tails much more frequently than there is real danger, but it is 
adaptive to splash your tail if you are a beaver. Infrequency cannot define 
what illusion is; to see that it is enough to realize that what people perceive as 
movies, are actually still images displayed quickly one. If Manzotti was right 
about  illusions,  then  the  illusion  of  movement  that  we  experience  when 
watching a movie would go after a sufficiently long exposure to it. However, 
movie  lovers  do  not  seem  to  experience  disillusionment  that  there  is  no 
movement even if they spend whole days in the theater. 
Even if we were to accept the view that illusions are just special cases of verid-
ical perception caused by infrequent correlations, how could we check which 
cases are more correct and why? Imagine an almost blind person. His or her 
visual perception functions incorrectly almost all the time, so his or her per-
ception is almost never correlated with the world events. But how does his or 
her case differ from the case of people with normal vision that see a stick in 
the water as bent? Classifying both cases as illusions would be a mistake. We 
would rather say that the second case is a common perceptual illusion while 
the first is a physiological inability to perceive objects. And how does it differ 
from  cases  when  I  mistake  a  roe  deer  in  a  forest  to  be  a  running  horse? 
Memory illusions, in which a person reports of a past event that seriously de-
viates from the event’s actual occurrence, seem to be problematic in this view 
as well (Roediger 1996). They may be as frequent as one wishes. Spread Mind and Causal Theories of Content 
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Are non-perceptual mistakes possible in Manzotti’s view? It is hard to see how 
any non-perceptual mistakes could exist according to his view if all represen-
tation (or rather presentation) is based on perception. Manzotti is in pains to 
stress that there is continuity between mental presentation and perception. 
But some of our presentations do not seem to veridical, even if perception is 
not affected. Take the Capgras delusion (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997). 
The  Capgras delusion  appears  when  a  person  consciously  recognizes  faces 
(this presentation is veridical) but because of the malfunction of the limbic 
system,  there  is  a  lack  of  an  appropriate  emotional  response.  As  a  result, 
a person looking at a face of her or his family member thinks she or he is look-
ing  at  a  doppelganger.  Now,  perceptual  processes  are  fine,  but  we  have 
a complex process that causes people to deny that they recognize their family 
members as family members. They recognize them only as doppelgangers of 
family members. Frequency has nothing to do with it. 
As a consequence, the view that presentation is continuous with perception 
allows for  no simple  falsity  in presentations.  Even  having  empty concepts, 
such as Pegasus, seems to be an inexplicable anomaly for this theory. Just like 
Dretske had to say that there is no such thing as false information (Dretske 
1982), Manzotti is pressed to deny false presentations. But then what is the 
cash value of such a notion of presentation? While Dretske appreciates the 
fact that agents do misrepresent (Dretske 1986) and claims that this represen-
tation is not reducible to semantic information (or natural meaning), Manzotti  
simply bites the bullet and says that there is no such thing as misrepresenta-
tion. But what explanatory use could his notion of presentation have? Defi-
nitely not the one that is traditionally associated with the notion of mental 
representation. 
Manzotti defines the relationship between the mind and the world in terms 
of a causal network; but causal factors seem to be apprehended in a holistic 
fashion: 
If causal properties are not located on objects but depend on the causal net-
work as a whole, then they cannot be located on a particular object. In a simi-
lar way, instead of being atomistically separate and autonomous, causes and 
effects become different ways of looking at processes. (Manzotti 2006: 54) 
On Manzotti’s view, there is no possibility to distinguish some causes as the 
causes of this particular presentation. This is so because of two reasons. First, 
it is difficult to determine the meaning of presentation in a continuous, never-
ending process; second, everything is always relative to the particular mind. 
I will show the detrimental consequences for understanding presentation in 
these terms in detail below. 
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3. The disjunction problem 
Imagine a person who calls water “vodka” by mistake. What is an extension of 
his or her term “water”? A priori, we have three possibilities:  
a) “Water” denotes water  
b) “Water” denotes water or vodka (water v vodka) 
c) “Water” denotes vodka 
Intuitively, only the answer (a) is correct. But a causal theory of reference 
does not give us any criteria necessary to fix the denotation in this standard 
manner. It cannot answer our question of what still does belong to the exten-
sion of the term T and what a new thing that does not belong to the extension 
of T is. This is where the so-called disjunction problem appears. There is no 
possibility to distinguish expanding the extension of the term from a mistake 
in using it. Actually, the causal theories, if they rely on the covariation of the 
use of the term T and the occurrence of referents (the simplified version of 
which  is  Manzotti’s  frequency  view),  have  to  embrace  the  answer (b). The 
extension always grows, and it’s impossible to shrink it again. As the set of 
referents grows, our description of reference needs to include more and more 
disjunctions. Thus, the disjunction problem is an essential problem for causal 
theories as well as any theories that explicate representation in purely causal 
terms (Fodor 1984). 
The informational semantics defended by Dretske (Dretske 1982) and Stampe 
(Stampe 1977) assumed that representation is reducible to information and 
that there is no such thing as false information. But, it means that there is 
no misrepresentation, and this is hardly credible. For this reason, informa-
tional semantics has been criticized as deeply flawed (Godfrey-Smith 1989). 
Manzotti’s claim that presentation is basically reducible to veridical percep-
tion leads to exactly the same problem. Dretske later even admitted that mere 
causal  relations  are  not  enough  to  explicate  the  notion  of  representation 
that are  applicable  to  misrepresentation  (Dretske  1986).  Manzotti,  howe-
ver, cannot escape the problem at all. All he can do is deny that there is mis-
representation. 
 
4. Anti-representationalism and misrepresentation 
It is notable that the same arguments to effect that the mind is a spread entity 
are  also  used  by  anti-representationalists  in  order  to  justify  their  view 
(e.g.,  Paco Calvo, who even uses the same term “causal spread” that was in-
troduced earlier by Andy Clark and Mike Wheeler (Garzon 2008; Clark and 
Wheeler 1998)). It does not take much to see that Manzotti’s theory of “presen-Spread Mind and Causal Theories of Content 
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tation” is rather anti-representational or at least too weak to defend a concept 
of representation. 
Anti-representationalists  such  as  Calvo  stress  the  continuity  between  the 
world and the mind; according to them, there is no difference between on-line 
and off-line representations. On-line representations appear only in the im-
mediate presence of an object perceived, while off-line ones are present when 
the object is absent. The latter are taken to be paradigmatic cases of represen-
tations. By taking continuity seriously, we can easily show that there is always 
some  link  between  the  representational  state  and  the  previous  state.  The 
causal chain is actually never broken. Then, however, it’s hard to distinguish 
the off-line representations from the on-line ones. It appears as if the presence 
of representations is always immediate. As the same kind of continuity is pre-
supposed by Manzotti, it is not so hard to see that his notion of “presentation” 
has to be quite weak. It is exactly the same kind of entity as Clark’s “on-line 
representation.” But, as Calvo argues, one can explain phenomena with on-
line representations by recourse to real-time dynamics, and in his view, this 
kind of theoretical entity seems to play no specific job assigned for representa-
tion at all. Let me elaborate on this. 
In his recent book, Ramsey argued that tracking theories of representation 
(that take indicators to be paradigmatic cases of it) have difficulties with spec-
ifying  what  is  specifically  representational about  them  (Ramsey  2007).  The 
idea that they influence behavior seems clear, but gravity does as well. The 
danger is that such theories may be too thin, having no role for content at all 
(note that I do not embrace Ramsey’s argument that Dretske’s or Millikan’s 
teleosemantics is trivialized for this reason, as there is a role for content in 
their theories; but this is a topic for another discussion). All in all, dispensing 
with content and playing with continuity may be detrimental. 
Interestingly, Fodor has recently also denounced any role for content, taking 
a purely referential view (Fodor 2008). However, there is a substitute for con-
tent in his theory. The form of the representation seems to differentiate “the 
US ex-president” and “George W. Bush” quite clearly. Just because Fodor can 
explain referential opacity by appeal to the form, his view does not suffer 
from the same objections that are detrimental to other referential views on 
representation. However, note that it is not possible for Manzotti to endorse 
such a view at all. He sees no role for vehicles of presentation (Manzotti 2006: 
60) and tries to make them as dynamic as possible. It seems that the form of 
presentation would also be quite spread in time and space. Manzotti, for this 
reason,  appears to think that the notion of vehicle and its form is dispensable 
(note that this is not in general accepted by all proponents of the dynamical 
view on cognition; see e.g. (Rączaszek-Leonardi 2009; Deacon 2011)). But then, 
referential opacity remains an inexplicable mystery for his theory. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Moreover, what lacks in Manzotti’s theory is a satisfactory concept of misrep-
resentation. Even if we agreed that misrepresentation is an on-line represen-
tation located in a continuous process, his account of misrepresentation in 
terms of frequency would be totally unsatisfactory. Illusions, delusions, hallu-
cinations, or simple fallacies in reasoning can appear very often and some of 
them seem to be innate (e.g. gambler’s fallacy). 
 It’s worth noticing that anti-representationalism also cannot avoid describing 
these phenomena and their description in terms of a continuous causal chain 
or process is not informative. Understanding representation in terms of spati-
otemporally spread chain seems to be drastically incomplete. Representation-
al theories do not state that representation is just veridical perception and it is 
as if anti-representationalists try to avoid explaining what else should be add-
ed but that perception will help describe fallacies or delusions. 
 Without a satisfactory notion of misrepresentation, no account of representa-
tion is acceptable (Dretske 1986). But this is also true of accounts of cognition, 
anti-representational included. A representational theory that denies the very 
possibility of there being any misrepresentation is a theory that deflates the 
concept of representation and trivializes it completely. Such representations 
may be indeed epiphenomenal. If you want to explain my behavior only by 
recourse to true beliefs, then I wish you good luck, especially because some of 
these beliefs are not mine at all. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that some radical externalist theories, such as Manzot-
ti’s theory of “presentations”, are equally misconceived as early causal theo-
ries of reference defended by Dretske or Stampe. I want to draw two general 
conclusions from this fact. These conclusions are pertinent to radical external-
ist theories such as Manzotti’s as well as to theories of representation in gen-
eral, enactivist or not. 
First, my criticism of Manzotti’s theory may apply to any radical enactivist 
theories that are anti-representational or as weakly representational as Man-
zotti’s. The similarity between Manzotti’s enactivism and the early causal the-
ories of reference shows that they both deflate representation. The ability to 
tackle misrepresentation is what should be required from any theory of rep-
resentation that is psychologically plausible. 
Second, it is remarkable that theories of representation that reject either con-
tent or meaning have difficulties with explaining what job the representation 
has qua representation in the cognitive system. To reject meaning (as radical 
internalists do) is to make it difficult to understand the relationship of repre-
sentations and the world in which the cognitive system finds itself in. The Spread Mind and Causal Theories of Content 
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theories of this kind are therefore solipsistic. But to reject content (as radical 
externalists do) is to make misrepresentations and false representations im-
possible, although the problem with relation to the world does not arise. 
Note that Manzotti’s troubles with misrepresentation and content are not at 
all implied simply by his enactivism. They arise because of a grossly simplified 
view on “presentation” that seems to take the claim that the world is its best 
presentation seriously. If this is so, then presentation cannot be wrong. How-
ever, this also means that there cannot be learning, as learning implies the 
ability to correct previous mistakes and recognize them as such. If enactive 
approach is the one that recognizes the crucial inter-dependency between the 
autonomous agent and the world it finds itself in, then many theories of rep-
resentation seem to be compatible with it (and some of them deal explicitly 
with  the  disjunction  problem  or  misrepresentation;  see  (Bickhard  2008; 
Bickhard 1993; Anderson and Rosenberg 2008)). The trouble is that it is all too 
easy to radically deny the need for representation. I dare say that this means 
denying the need for cognition and learning as well, but that is a matter for 
further discussion. 
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